Exceptions to Consideration Requirement in California by Smith, James B.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 12 | Issue 4 Article 2
1-1961
Exceptions to Consideration Requirement in
California
James B. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
James B. Smith, Exceptions to Consideration Requirement in California, 12 Hastings L.J. 377 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol12/iss4/2
Exceptions to Consideration Requirement
In California
By JAMms B. SmITH*
CONSIDERATION IS necessary to make a promise binding, to
modify a binding promise, or to discharge a binding promise upon
modified terms; in brief to create, modify or discharge a contract.'
Exception is made in each case, and this article attempts to compile
the California exceptions.
I. EXCEPTIONS WITH REGARD TO
ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISES
This section may be divided into three parts: (1) Enforcement
of promises because of detrimental reliance; (2) the special rule of
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.; and (3) enforcement of promises be-
cause of moral obligation. The last, though a theory of consideration,
is sufficiently exceptional to warrant discussion.
A. Detrimental Reliance
Doctrine and Difficulties
The rule of Restatement section 90 is familiar to all.2 It attempts
to substitute a more satisfactory doctrine for that of "promissory es-
toppel." Promissory estoppel is a true term of art, however, and the
California courts have transferred it to Restatement section 90, as the
label therefor.8 It will be used freely in this article and interchange-
ably with language of detrimental reliance.
* LL.B. 1946, University of San Francisco; Professor of Law, Golden Gate College
School of Law; member, Calif. bar. The writer wishes to asknowledge the valuable assist-
ance given by Paul C. Ligda, student at Golden Gate College School of Law.
I For a comprehensive review of the subject of consideration and a comparison of
the civil and common law requirements, see Cause and Consideration, 47 CALiF. L. REv.
74 (1959). See also On the Complexity of Consideration, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 777 (1941).
2 
IESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932): "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character
on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance, is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
3 See Van Hook v. Southern Cal. Waiters Alliance, 158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 323 P.2d
212 (1958); Frebank Co. v. White, 152 Cal. App. 2d 522, 313 P.2d 633 (1957); Grad-
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Like all reforms Restatement section 90 has its faults, two of
which bear discussion.
One is the failure of the draftsman to indicate how far the section
promises are to be considered part of the total scheme of the Restate-
ment. Unlike other major sections of the Restatement, section 90 has
no comments although it was destined to be controversial. While this
avoids rigidity, it leaves ambiguity. Thus we have the question of
whether the third party beneficiary rules apply to section 90 promises
so as to permit protection of third persons who rely on promises.
4
While they permit of application,5 one is not satisfied, without it be-
ing spelled out, that they are intended to apply.
The other is its recognition of but one degree of injustice, that
which requires enforcement of the promise. This appears to exclude
relief in those cases in which the promisee has suffered damage by
virtue of reliance on the promise but not to such an extent as to call
for specific enforcement, cases in which the appropriate relief would
be an award of damages sufficient to save the promisee from loss.,
Professor Corbin has it that "enforcement" of a promise may include
such relief, 7 but does not find that section 90 permits it.
If in fact relief cannot be given under section 90 in these cases,
then section 90 seems destined to become but part of the eclectic
don v. Knight, 138 Cal. App. 2d 577, 292 P.2d 632 (1956). The first and last of these
cases apply, coextensively, the doctrine of equitable estoppel codified in CAL. CODE Civ.
Pnoc. § 1962 (3), viz., that ". . . whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it." See generally Promissory Estoppel in Cal-
ifornia, 5 STAN. L. REv. 783 (1952-1953). For "what's wrong with 'promissory estop-
pel"' see 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 204 (1950).
4 In Burgess v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 210 Cal. 180, 290 Pac. 1029
(1930), a third person was protected on principles of promissory estoppel (mortgagee
gave mortgagor letter agreeing to release part of property upon payment of 6,000 dollars;
third person who loaned money to mortgagor on strength of letter and security of prop-
erty to be released could enforce mortgagee's promise).
5 If the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise is to confer on a third
person a right against the promisor, which it was in Burgess v. California Mut. Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, supra note 4, where the letter was obtained from the mortgagee to induce
the loan from the third person, then the third person could be a third party donee bene-
ficiary in accordance with the provision of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 133(1) (a), that
one is a "donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the
accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise
... is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor
to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee
to the beneficiary." Such a promise is not revocable. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 142
(1932). Contra, 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 200, at 656-57.
6 The promised gift of land, discussed infra, p. -- , can be such a case. See also
Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (CC D.C. 1948).
7 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 200, at 657-58. See also § 205.
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process which it was designed to displace.
Particular Applications
California has made the routine applications of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel discussed in this section.
1. Charitable Subscriptions
While promissory estoppel applies to charitable subscriptions,8
most of the cases have been decided on a consideration theory. Where
the subscription calls for a specific sum to be raised for a specific
purpose and is executed ".... in consideration of others subscribing,"
the reciprocal promises of the other subscribers afford "... a well-
recognized consideration."O Where the donation is to be devoted to
a particular purpose and is accepted with that condition attached, an
obligation is incurred by the charity which "... will satisfy the re-
quirements of a consideration."1° Where individual subscriptions were
used to induce pledges from foundations, ". . . this was consideration"
for the individual subscriptions." The charity may in each instance
enforce the subscription as a third party donee beneficiary.
The case of the permanent charity seeking to enforce the ordinary
subscription has not arisen; for example, of United Crusade seeking
to enforce a twenty-five dollar pledge. It can be said that such a charity
incurs liability from one moment to the next on the strength of pledges
then in hand and therefore can enforce all pledges on grounds of
promissory estoppel.
2. Promised Gifts of Land
A promised gift of land has been enforced where the promisee
has made valuable improvements.' 2 It has been suggested that other
things such as transplantation of self and family to a new area, cou-
pled with sacrifice of other opportunities, would suffice.' s8
3. Pensions and Bonuses
Where an employer has a fixed pension plan and the employee
continues in employment with knowledge of it, the pension can be
8 University of So. Cal. v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283 Pac. 949 (1929) (building
project commenced).
9 Id at 49, 283 Pac. at 953.
10 First Trust & Savings Bank v. Coe College, 8 Cal. App. 2d 195, 47 P.2d 481
(1935).
1I ibid.
12 Green v.Brown, 37 Cal. 2d 391, 232 P.2d 487 (1951). See also Klein v. Farmer,
85 Cal. App. 2d 545, 194 P.2d 106 (1948) (promised gift of securities).
13 Palmer v. Phillips, 123 Cal. App. 2d 291, 266 P.2d 850 (1954). 1 Co3iWN, CON-
TRAcTs, op. cit. supra note 3, § 205, at 670-71, 673.
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enforced on the contract theory that the employer impliedly offers
the employee salary and bonus for continued services which the em-
ployee accepts by continuing in employment. 14
The litigated cases, however, have been ones in which the waters
have been muddied in some way such that the courts have preferred
to rely on estoppel, promissory or equitable, or both, or on a combi-
nation of estoppel and consideration. 15 In the leading case of Hunter
v. Sparling,16 for example, the promisee worked throughout his life
for a Japanese banking concern which had a retirement plan which
paid substantial lump sum benefits. He was assured that he would
receive them and from time to time learned some but never the full
details of the plan. The bank was placed in conservatorship upon the
outbreak of World War II, at a time when payment of benefits was
due. The benefits were held collectible. The court said that while
recovery could be had on the contract theory outlined above, it need
not be predicated solely on that theory and could be placed upon the
ground of promissory estoppel as well.
Contract and detrimental reliance were made companion grounds
for recovery of a 4,000 dollar bonus in Frebank Co. v. White" where,
in mid-year, an employer, to enable his employee to get a home loan,
furnished the lender with a statement indicating that the employee
would get a bonus of at least 4,000 dollars for the year.
4. Gratuitous Undertakings; Promises to Obtain Insurance for Another
Graddon v. Knight18 involved the stock problem in this area, the
promise to obtain insurance for another. A bank which was financing
a home purchase volunteered to get fire insurance for the buyer. It
failed to do so and the house burned down. The defense was that it
would violate the parol evidence rule to permit evidence of the bank's
promise because the deed of trust required the buyer to obtain insur-
ance. As to this defense, it was held that the bank's promise was not
in contravention of, but merely collateral to, the written contract (the
deed of trust), that it was merely an agreement by which the bank
became the buyer's agent to procure insurance. The court then relied
on Restatement section 90 to impose liability on the bank for failure
14 Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 722, 197 P.2d 807 (1948).
1 Van Hook v. Southern Cal. Waiters Alliance, 158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 323 P.2d 212
(1958); West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (1951); Hunter
v. Sparling, supra note 14.
16 Supra note 14.
17 152 Cal. App. 2d 522, 313 P.2d 633 (1957). Compare Dow v. River Farms Co.,
110 Cal. App. 2d 403, 243 P.2d 95 (1952) (promised bonus for past services not en-
forceable).
18 138 Cal. App. 2d 577, 292 P.2d 632 (1956). Compare Goehring v. Stockton
Morris Plan Co., 93 Cal. App. 2d 417, 209 P.2d 41 (1949).
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to fulfill its promise. The Restatement of Agency prescribes an agency-
neglect of duty approach.19
Cases involving gratuitous promises to insure have invariably been
cases in which the promisor has been motivated by a selfish interest,
either a desire to protect his own interest in property as in the Grad-
don case, or a desire to cultivate business good will of the promisee.
This would create justification for reliance on the promise. Given a
case in which the promise was made purely as an accommodation, the
Restatement of Agency would still impose liability,20 but one feels that
courts might be prepared to draw a line at this point.
5. Promises Not to Enforce Liens
The classic case of the mortgagor who makes improvements in
reliance on a promise not to enforce the mortgage for a specific period
of time2l has not appeared in California, but it is clear that such a
promise would be enforced.22 Wade v. Markwell & Co.23 holds in
effect that the creditor is estopped to foreclose when he has led the
debtor to believe that payment will not be required until demand is
made, and as a necessary incident that the creditor is estopped to rely
on the rule of Civil Code section 1698.24
6. Other Applications
Among other types of promises to which the doctrine of estoppel
has been applied and to which the doctrine of promissory estoppel
would be applicable are promises to give or not revoke licenses which
have induced expenditures, and promises not to plead the statute of
limitations.
25
B. Rule of Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
Promises are bargain promises or non-bargain promises. Consid-
eration is the ground, and should be the sole ground, for the enforce-
19 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 378, illustration 2 (1958). Such approach
was taken in Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 118 Pac. 459 (1911). See also
CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 2850-51.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 378, illustration 2 (1958).
21 RESTATENENT, CONTRACTS § 90, illustration 1 (1932). 1 WMLISTON, CoNTRACTS
§ 140, at 612-13 (3d ed. 1957).
22 City of Los Angeles v. Krutz, 170 Cal. 344, 149 Pac. 580 (1915); Wade v. Mark-
well & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497 (1953).
23 Supra note 22.
24 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698: A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in
writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not otherwise."
25 See cases collected in Promissory Estoppel, 5 STAN. L. REv. 783, note 33, at 788
(1952) (licenses). See Herman v. Brown, 91 Cal. App. 2d 758, 205 P.2d 1086 (1949)
(statute of limitations). See also cases collected in 5 STAN. L. REv. 783, note 8, at 784
(1952-53). See further Morrison v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 175 Cal. App. 2d 765,
346 P.2d 917 (1959) (promise to make loan for purchase of home); Medberry v. Olco-
vich, 15 Cal. App. 2d 263, 59 P.2d 551 (1936).
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ment of the first. The doctrine of detrimental reliance was conceived
to permit enforcement of the second. To apply promissory estoppel
to a promise contemplating an exchange is to deprive a party of his
right of freedom of contract; of his right to condition his promise upon
a specific exchange.26
These principles become severely tested in the field of sub-bids.
General contractor asks bids from subcontractors, makes his general
bid from a composition thereof and wins the job, after which one of
the subcontractors attempts to revoke. If we apply the theories which
have been advanced, the subcontractor can do so. The general con-
tractor must bind the sub-bid by contract conventions before he makes
his general bid, if he is to be safe. This, of course, he can do by re-
quiring that each sub-bid be reduced to a bilateral contract in which
he promises to use it if it proves the lowest and to award the job to
the subcontractor if he wins the general bid. But to impose such a
requirement is to impose a clog upon industry, and the modem atti-
tude, as shown by present day advocacy of firm offer statutes, 27 is to
free business of such clogs.
Into such a setting came the sub-bid case of Drennan v. Star Paving
Co.28 In the leading case of James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.29 it had
been held that the sub-bid was revocable. In what was apparently an
effort to avoid applying promissory estoppel directly to a bargain prom-
ise while at the same time applying it to a situation of the type at hand,
the court in Drennan engaged in this rationalization: Where a promise
is made for an act (i.e., there is an offer for a unilateral contract),
Restatement of Contracts section 45 implies a subsidiary promise not
to revoke a main promise (the offer) once performance of the act is
26 James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). 1 CORBIN, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 200, at 658.
27 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-105: "An offer by a merchant to buy or sell
goods in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is
not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for
a reasonable time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months."
N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW, Part 2, § 294(4): "When hereafter an offer to enter into a
contract is made in a writing signed by the offeror, or by his agent, which states that
the offer is irrevocable during a period set forth or until a time fixed, the offer shall not
be revocable during such period or until such time because the absence of consideration
for the assurance or irrevocability. When such a writing states that the offer is irrevocable
but does not state any period of time of irrevocability, it shall be construed to state that
the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time." In California, local ordinance may make
bids on public works irrevocable for some period of time. See, e.g., M. F. Kemper
Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 235 P.2 7 (1951).
2851 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958), noted 47 CALIF. L. REV. 405 (1959), 10
HASTINGs L.J. 435 (1959), 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 413 (1959), 11 STAN. L. REV. 546
(1959).
29 Supra note 26.
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begun.30 Section 45 makes such part performance consideration for
the subsidiary promise. It suggests that detrimental reliance may also
make the subsidiary promise binding. Analogizing, it can be said
that where, as in the sub-bid situation, there is an offer for a bilateral
contract, a subsidiary promise not to revoke the main promise (the
offer) can be implied once action is taken which the promise was
designed to induce. One is satisfied with the result.
A difficulty with the reasoning is that, in order to bring the concept
of Restatement section 90 to section 45's subsidiary promise, the court
relies on the last sentence of Comment b to section 45 which is as
follows, with emphasis added: "Part performance (furnishes) consid-
eration for the subsidiary promise. Moreover, merely acting in justi-
fiable reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as a sufficient reason
for making a promise binding (see § 90)." This seems intended only
to call attention to section 90, not correlate the sections, and this most
vital link in the chain of the court's rationale is its weakest.
The court had been faced with the problem of whether promissory
estoppel could be applied to a bargain promise in the earlier, trouble-
some case of Bard v. Kent3l where it had denied such application.
Its reconciliation of that case seems to indicate a generally softened
attitude. In the Bard case a lessee desired renewal of the lease. He
was prepared to make valuable improvements, which the lessor de-
sired. She suggested he have an architect prepare plans. She then
executed an option to renew which recited that it was for a consid-
eration of ten dollars. This was never paid. After the lessee had spent
money on an architect, the lessor died. It was held that the expendi-
ture could not be consideration for the lessor's promise (the option)
because ten dollars, not the expenditure, had been bargained for that
promise. The lessee had not pleaded estoppel but sought to rely on
it, to which the court answered: 
2
There must... be a promise on which reliance may be based.
Defendant did not plead the issue of promissory estoppel at the
trial, and there is nothing in the record to show that... [the lessor]
at any time promised to keep the option open or made any other
so RES TATmEN, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932): "If an offer for a unilateral contract is
made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the of-
feree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate per-
formance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered with-
in the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, within a reasonable time."
Comment b: ". . . The main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, necessarily
implied, that if part of the requested performance is given, the offeror will not revoke
his offer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted .. "
3' 19 Cal. 2d 449, 122 P.2d 8, 139 A.L.R. 1032 (1942).
32 Id at 453, 122 P.2d at 10, 139 A.L.R. 1035.
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promise on which defendant could rely. She merely made without
consideration an offer, which was never accepted, to renew the lease.
In the Drennan case, the Bard case is reconciled with the statement
that "... it does not appear that the offeree's reliance was 'of a definite
and substantial character' so that injustice could be avoided 'only by
the enforcement of the promise' "3 This infers that in the final anal-
ysis it was only the insubstantiality of the lessee's action in reliance
on the option that was fatal and that in another Bard case, with es-
toppel pleaded and more substantial action taken, another result might
be obtained. It is interesting to note that if the subsidiary promise
concept were applied to the Bard option we would have a promise
to keep a promise (the subsidiary promise) to keep a promise (the
option).
C. Moral Obligation
It was the common law rule that moral obligation would support
a promise only if it arose out of a pre-existing legal obligation. Civil
Code section 1606 provides that ". . a moral obligation originating
in some benefit conferred upon the promisor or prejudice suffered by
the promisee, is... a good consideration for a promise, to an extent
corresponding with the extent of the obligation." In Estate of McCon-
nell34 this was held to be nothing more than a codification of the com-
mon law rule. Except for the real estate commission cases, infra, this
continued to be the state of the California law until Desny v. Wilder.35
Ex-Legal Obligations
As indicated, moral obligation surviving a legal obligation will
support a promise to satisfy the latter. This of course is the promise
to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in
bankruptcy.
Where the bar is the statute of limitations, most states, including
California, require a written promise or acknowledgment. 36 Earlier
California cases indicated that an acknowledgment had to contain
an affirmative expression of willingness to pay.37 Based upon re-
examination of these cases, it was held in Western Coal & Mining
3. 51 Cal. 2d 409, at 417, 333 P.2d 757, at 761.
34 6 Cal. 2d 493, 58 P.2d 639 (1936).
3546 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
36 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 86, comment a (1932). CAL. CODE CIV. PnoC.
§ 360. As to distinctions between promises or acknowledgments made before and after
the statute runs, see 1 W VKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions § 169 (7th Ed. 1960).
37 See cases reviewed in Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal. 2d 819, 167
P.2d 719 (1946).
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Co. v. Jones38 that the rule in fact was merely that there could not
be an expression of unwillingness to pay.
Where the bar is discharged in bankruptcy there is no requirement
of a writing,3 9 but Restatement of Contracts, section 87 requires a
promise in this instance,40 and California has not decided otherwise.
The promise or acknowledgment must be communicated to the
creditor or to a person who may be treated as his agent or representa-
tive to receive it.41
Benefits Conferred in Expectation of Compensation
It is said that a growing body of case law supports the view that
moral obligation is sufficient to sustain a promise to reward benefits
conferred in expectation of compensation under circumstances which
do not permit recovery in contract.42 A more precise statement of the
rule is to be found in the excerpts from Desny v. Wilder,43 which is
the first California case to recognize it.
The cases offered in support of the proposition seem to be almost
entirely of two types, neither of which really supports it: cases in which
the promisor was or should have been on notice that the benefit was
conferred in expectation of compensation, in which case acceptance
of the benefits ought to create a contractual obligation; and cases
which traditionally have been dealt with in quasi-contract such as
those involving involuntary bailments and those involving physicians
rendering services to unconscious persons at the scene of an accident.44
Nevertheless the "rule" is being accepted, as witness Desny v. Wilder,
and by acceptance given credence.
In California, intermediately between the cases recognizing moral
obligation only if it arises out of legal obligation and Desny v. Wilder,
lie real estate commission cases in which it has been held that a written
agreement to pay for brokerage services is supported by the moral
obligation to do so, where commissions were originally uncollectible
38 Id.
39 Lambert v. Schmalz, 118 Cal. 33, 50 Pac. 13 (1897). RESTATEIMNT, CONTRACTS
§ 87 (1932).
40 See 1 WmLISTON, op. cit. supra note 21, § 158, at 657, where the author states
that mere acknowledgment or part payment is "not sufficiently clear."
4 xEaston v. Ash, 18 Cal. 2d 530, 116 P.2d 433 (1941); Clmin v. First Fed. Trust
Co., 189 Cal. 248, 207 Pac. 1009 (1922); Herman v. Brown, 91 Cal. App. 2d 758, 205
P.2d 1086 (1949); Van Cauteren v. Forger, 45 Cal. App. 2d 388, 114 P.2d 6 (1941).
Compare Estate of Azevedo, 17 Cal. App. 2d 710, 62 P.2d 1058 (1936).
42 Annot, 8 A.L.R. 2d 798 (1949).
-3 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
44See cases collected in Annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 798 (1949). REsTATEN=, CON-
TRACTS §72 (1932).
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for lack of a writing. 45 But, as has been pointed out,46 these can be
dealt with on the basis that the subsequent writing merely removes
the bar of the statute of frauds, thus vitalizing what was otherwise a
valid contract.
Desny v. Wilder47 was an appeal from an order denying a motion
to set aside a summary judgment. Plaintiff's deposition, treated as an
affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, told this
story: He called defendant's office asking for an appointment with
defendant. Defendant's secretary insisted he disclose his purpose. He
then told her the substance of an idea he had for a movie. He did
not remember whether he said anything about sale of the idea in this
conversation. (This is a key point in the testimony since it indicates
that in the first instance the idea was "blurted out," as the court de-
scribes in the excerpt below.) Defendant's secretary advised that it
would be difficult to get an appointment with defendant. Plaintiff then
asked leave to send defendant a sixty-five page synopsis of the story
which he had prepared. The secretary protested that defendant would
not read this and that it would have to be cut down to three or four
pages. Two days later plaintiff called to advise that such a summary
was ready. He was requested to read it to the secretary so she could
take it down in shorthand, after which she promised to present it to
defendant. In this conversation, if not previously, plaintiff stated that
it was his purpose to sell the idea to defendant and that he expected
to be paid for it if it were used. The secretary assured him that he
would be. The next thing he knew the idea appeared as a movie and
he was never paid for it. Plaintiff's action was for 150,000 dollars as
the reasonable value of the idea.
The court's function on such an appeal is to determine if it ap-
pears that there is a triable issue. If so a summary judgment is to be
reversed. In this connection the court reasoned thusly: (a) Disclosure
of an idea can be the subject of a bargain but the bargain must be
struck before the idea is disclosed. (b) If the idea is disclosed volun-
tarily-blurted out-it ceases to be able to serve as a consideration.
(c) However if, after voluntary disclosure, the discloser signifies that
he intends sale of the idea, and the disclosee, with knowledge of such
fact, accepts implementation (the summary of the synopsis), a con-
45 Coulter v. Howard, 203 Cal. 17, 262 Pac. 751 (1927); Hfllman v. Koch, 92 Cal.
App. 2d 163, 206 P.2d 434 (1949).
46 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALiFORNIA LAW Contracts § 73, at 78 (7th ed. 1960).
4 Supra note 40. See also Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 319 P.2d 776
(1957) (Public Defender); Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 469,
310 P.2d 436 (1957) ("A man's beer" and "A real man's beer"). Compare Heckenkamp
vs. Zio Television Programs, 157 Cal. App. 2d 293, 321 P.2d 137 (1958) (Highway
Patrol).
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tract by conduct results with respect to the value of the implementa-
lion. To this extent at least, said the court, a triable issue is made to
appear. This assumes that the secretary can be found to have acted
as agent of the defendant in all respects.
What is important for our purposes however is the court's state-
ment that if, after voluntary disclosure, there is an express promise
to pay for the idea, the promise can be enforced.
The court's thinking on both points is found in this excerpt from
the opinion:
48
... [C]onveyance of an idea can constitute valuable consideration
and can be bargained for before it is disclosed to the proposed pur-
chaser, but once it is conveyed, i.e., disclosed to him and he has
grasped it, it is henceforth his own and he may work with it and
use it as he sees fit. In the field of entertainment the producer may
properly and validly agree that he will pay for the service of con-
veying to him ideas which are valuable and which he can put to
profitable use. Furthermore, where an idea has been conveyed with
the expectation by the purveyor that compensation will be paid if
the idea is used, there is no reason why the producer who has been
the beneficiary of the conveyance of such an idea, and who finds it
valuable and is profiting by it, may not then for the first time, al-
though he is not at that time under legal obligation so to do, promise
to pay a reasonable compensation for that idea-that is, for the past
service of furnishing it to him-and thus create a valid obligation. As
said in 12 American Jurisprudence 603, section 110, "there is con-
siderable authority which supports the view that the moral obligation
arising from a benefit of a material or pecuniary nature conferred
upon the promisor by past services, rendered in the expectation that
they were to be paid for-or, at least, if rendered upon the assumption
by the person rendering them, though mistaken, that they would cre-
ate a real liability-and otherwise, in circumstances, creating a moral
obligation on the part of the promisor to pay for the same, will sup-
port an executory promise to do so, although there was, previous to
such promise, no legal liability or promise, perfect or imperfect."...
But, assuming legality of consideration, the idea purveyor cannot
prevail in an action to recover compensation for an abstract idea
unless (a) before or after disclosure he has obtained an express
promise to pay, or (b) the circumstances preceding and attending
disclosure, together with the conduct of the offeree acting with
knowledge of the circumstances, show a promise of the type usually
referred to as "implied" or "implied-in-fact"... That is, if the idea
purveyor has clearly conditioned his offer to convey the idea upon
an obligation to pay for it if it is used by the offeree and the offeree,
knowing the condition before he knows the idea, voluntarily accepts
its disclosure (necessarily on the specified basis) and finds it valuable
48 Id. at 737-739, 299 P.2d at 269. The writer is advised by counsel in the case
that it was settled.
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and uses it, the law will either apply the objective test.., and bold
that the parties have made an express (sometimes called implied-in-
fact) contract, or under those circumstances, as some writers view it,
the law itself, to prevent fraud and unjust enrichment, will imply a
promise to compensate. [Emphasis added.]
Such inferred or implied promise, if it is to be found at all, must
be based on circumstances which were known to the producer at and
preceding the time of disclosure of the idea to him and he must
voluntarily accept the disclosure, knowing the conditions on which
it is tendered. Section 1584 of the Civil Code... can have no appli-
cation unless the offeree has an opportunity to reject the considera-
tion-the proffered conveyance of the idea-before it is conveyed.
Unless the offeree has an opportunity to reject the consideration-
the proffered conveyance of the idea-before it is conveyed he can-
not be said to accept .... The idea man who blurts out his idea
without having first made his bargain has no one but himself to blame
for the loss of his bargaining power. The law will not in any event,
from demands stated subsequent to the unconditioned disclosure of
an abstract idea, imply a promise to pay for the idea, for its use, or
for its previous disclosure. The law will not imply a promise to pay
for an idea from the mere facts that the idea has been conveyed, is
valuable, and has been used for profit; this is true even though the
conveyance has been made with the hope or expectation that some
obligation will ensue. So, if the plaintiff here is claiming only for the
conveyance of the idea of making a dramatic production out of the
life of Floyd Collins he must fail unless in conformity with the above
stated rules he can establish a contract to pay.
From plaintiff's testimony ... it does not appear that a contract
to pay for conveyance of the abstract photoplay idea had been made,
or that the basis for inferring such a contract from subsequent re-
lated acts of the defendants had been established, at the time plaintiff
disclosed his basic idea to the secretary. Defendants, consequently,
were at that time and from then on free to use the abstract idea if
they saw fit to engage in the necessary research and develop it to the
point of a usable script. Whether defendants did that, or whether
they actually accepted and used plaintiff's synopsis, is another ques-
tion. And whether by accepting plaintiff's synopsis and using it, if
they did accept and use it, they may be found to have implicitly...
agreed to pay for whatever value the synopsis possessed as a composi-
tion embodying, adapting and implementing the idea, is also a ques-
tion which, upon the present summary judgment record, is pertinent
for consideration, in reaching our ultimate conclusion. That is, if
the evidence suggests that defendants accepted plaintiff's synopsis,
did they not necessarily accept it upon the terms on which he had
offered it? Certainly the mere fact that the idea had been disclosed
under the circumstances shown here would not preclude the finding
of an implied (inferred in fact) contract to pay for the synopsis,




A situation may create an obligation which transcends the law and
ought to be so treated. This is the "life-saving case" in which a promise
is made to reward a person who has incurred a crippling injury while
saving the life of the promisor. In the leading case of Webb v. McGow-
in 9 the court, to enforce the promise, relied on a moral obligation
theory which has not been mentioned heretofore, but which is really
quasi-contract with a dash of moral obligation thrown in-the theory
that, if a service is rendered which the recipient would have asked
for had he had the opportunity, it is to be presumed by a fiction of
relation back or, more simply if one prefers, to be implied, that the
services were rendered on request. If we stop here we have a quasi-
contract theory. If we throw in something about moral obligation,
we have the Webb case. The matter is put this way in the Webb
case:
50
Some authorities hold that, for a moral obligation to support a sub-
sequent promise to pay, there must have existed a prior legal or
equitable obligation, which for some reason had become unenforce-
able, but for which the promisor was still morally bound. This rule,
however, is subject to qualification in those cases where the promisor
having received a material benefit from the promisee, is morally
bound to compensate him for the services rendered and in consider-
ation of this obligation promises to pay. In such cases the subsequent
promise to pay is an affimance or ratification of the services rendered
carrying with it the presumption that a previous request for the
service was made....
A case of this kind has not appeared in California.
II. EXCEPTIONS WITH REGARD TO
MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE OF PROMISES
It is a fact of life that parties modify contracts as they see fit and
without regard to the requirement of consideration. The only justifi-
cation for adherence to that requirement is that it deters the "hold
up" case.5' This is a danger which is undoubtedly more fancied than
real and, as Professor Corbin suggests, it can be left to the courts to
separate the sheep from the goats.52 On the other hand by giving
-1927 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935).
5o Id. at -, 168 So. at 198.
51 See, e.g., Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942); Alaska
Packers Assn. v. Domenico, 117 Fed. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). See Note, 28 So. CAL. L.
REv. 317 (1955).
5 2 Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration? 27 YALE L. J. 362, 373
(1917).
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parties wide latitude to modify contracts the courts can be saved much
sterile litigation. We find the law so oriented.
The same is true with regard to discharge of contracts. If parties
are sensible enough to settle a hopeless situation on mutually agree-
able terms it does the law no good to disturb their handiwork.
California statute has always given substantial power to modify,53
complete power to discharge, 54 obligations without regard to consid-
eration. The courts have substantially enlarged the power to modify
by recognizing that an executory contract may be rescinded or ex-
tinguished by novation and a new contract then formed on terms which
are less onerous as to one party. While these involve the consideration
theory that the mutual release of executory rights is consideration
for the rescission or novation, they are in fact indirect methods by
which modification can be achieved without consideration and need
to be discussed in this article. The courts have also conceived a meth-
od of discharge-called variously abandonment, abrogation, termina-
tion, cancellation and rescission-which, while it rests upon the same
theory of consideration, is equally in derogation of the requirement
of consideration. It too will be discussed.
It is in fact the superabundance of devices by which modification
or discharge can be achieved in some measure of disregard of the
principle of consideration that causes confusion in this area. Accord
and satisfaction is another device which, while sounding in contract,
involves exceptional treatment of the requirement of consideration
and which therefore must be discussed to some extent.
A. Statutory Provisions Relating to Modification
Oral Contracts; Civil Code Section 1697
Civil Code section 169755 seems to be self-explanatory. It has not
been the subject of interpretation and there is but a handful of cases
in which it has been involved. It provides that an oral contract "...
may be altered in any respect by consent of the parties, in writing,
53 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1697: "A contract not in writing may be altered in any respect
by consent of the parties, in writing, without a new consideration, and is extinguished
thereby to the extent of the new alteration." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1698: "A contract in
writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and
not otherwise."
54 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1524: "Part performance of an obligation, either before or
after a breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the creditor in writing, in satisfaction,
or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in writing for that purpose, though without any
new consideration, extinguishes the obligation." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1541: "An obligation
is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a new
consideration, or in writing, with or without a new consideration."
55 Full text, supra note 49.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
without a new consideration, and is extinguished thereby to the extent
of the new alteration." It implies that oral modification of an oral con-
tract requires consideration. No case is found.
Written Contracts; Civil Code Section 1698
Civil Code section 169856 provides that a written contract ".
may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral agree-
ment, and not otherwise."
The requirement of a written "contract" to modify a contract in
writing compels the conclusion that consideration is necessary for this
method of modification. Again no case is found which actually deals
with the point.
The alternative, executed oral agreement, is a method of modifica-
tion which dispenses with the requirement of consideration.57 It per-
mits such things as reduction of rent on a lease"s to the extent that
the lesser amount is actually accepted by the landlord, 59 modification
of a property settlement agreement,60 and modification of a partner-
ship agreement with respect to division of profits. 61
The oral agreement need not be to modify the contract, only to do
something which is inconsistent with it, and it may be implied from
a course of conduct which is inconsistent with the written agreement.62
Section 1698 does not apply where the contract contains a provision
for modification, 63 but a contract can be modified by executed oral
agreement though it provides against alteration except by written
agreement.64 And, despite the provisions of section 1698, a party may
be estopped to deny an oral agreement to modify.
6 5
The power to modify was enlarged by D. L. Godbey & Sons Constr.
Co. v. Deane,66 where it was held that while 1698 requires an "exe-
5 Full text, supra note 49.
57D. L. Godbey & Sons Constr. Co. v. Deane, 39 Cal. 2d 429, 432, 246 P. 2d 946
(1952).
is BJulian v. Gold, 214 Cal. 74, 3 Pac. 2d 1009 (1931). Note that this method re-
quires a lease to be treated as a divisible contract. Compare Macauley v. Jayben Corp.,
17 Cal. App. 2d 37, 61 P.2d 354 (1936) (lesser amount must be tendered and accepted
as in full payment of rent).
51 Stoltenberg v. Harveston, 1 Cal. 2d 264, 34 P.2d 472 (1934) (landlord may re-
instate original rent requirements as to future rents).
60 Taylor v. Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 2d 518, 103 P.2d 575 (1940).
61 Keeble v. Brown, 123 Cal. App. 2d 126, 266 P.2d 569 (1954).
62 Id.; Taylor v. Taylor, supra note 56; Mundt v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
35 Cal. App. 2d 416, 95 P.2d 966 (1939).
63 Snow Mountain Water & Power Co. v. Kronen, 191 Cal. 312, 216 Pac. 589
(1923); Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc'y, 82 Cal. 557, 22 Pac. 1125 (1890).
64 Heple v. Kluge, 114 Cal. App. 2d 473, 250 P.2d 694 (1953).
65 Panno v. Russo, 82 Cal. App. 2d 408, 186 P.2d 452 (1947).
6 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 (1952).
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cuted" oral agreement to modify, and while executed means per-
formed on both sides, 1698 applies only when the modifying agreement
is not supported by consideration; that if it is, it becomes binding
when performed by one party. To Justice Schauer, dissenting, this
was but ". . . one further step in the court-erosion of salutary code pro-
visions ... by a process disguised as statutory construction.."67
Civil Code Section 1501 and
Code of Civil Procedure Section 2706
Though it goes beyond the scope of the article, attention must be
called to Civil Code section 1501, and Code of Civil Procedure section
270668 if for no other reason than that they can embarrass the practi-
tioner. They make failure to object to defects in tender waiver thereof,
and the companion rule has been established that a particular objection
waives others. 69 The purpose of the rule is to give a party an oppor-
tunity to cure defects in a tender, 70 and is based on principles of es-
toppel.71 It requires care to be exercised in the drafting of corres-
pondence which goes into defects in a tender.
B. Section 1698 Applies Only to "Alteration"
It has been pointed out many times that Civil Code section 1698
applies only to "alteration" and has no application if the process is of
another kind.
72
67 Id. at 434, 434, 246 P.2d at 949, 949 (dissent).
68 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1501: "All objections to the mode of an offer of performance
which the creditor has an opportunity to state at the time to the person making the offer,
and which could be then obviated by him, are waived by the creditor, if not then stated."
CAL. CODE Crv. Paoc. § 2076: "The person to whom a tender is made must, at the
time, specify any objection he may have to the money, instrument, or property, or he
must be deemed to have waived it; and if the objection be to the amount of money,
the terms of the instrument, or the amount of kind of property, he must specify the
amount, terms, or kind which he requires, or be precluded from objecting afterwards."
69 Ray Thomas, Inc. v. Cowan, 99 Cal. App. 140, 277 Pac. 1086 (1929); Bogue v.
Roeth, 98 Cal. App. 257, 276 Pac. 1071 (1929).
70 Weinberg v. Dayton Storage Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 750, 124 P.2d 155 (1942).
71 Hind v. Oriental Products Co., 195 Cal. 655, 235 Pac. 438 (1925).
72 Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314, 95 Pac. 154 (1908); Bush v. Vernon, 135 Cal.
App. 2d 33, 286 P.2d 903 (1955); Jura v. Sunshine Biscuits, 118 Cal. App. 2d 442, 258
P.2d 90 (1953); Sass v. Hank, 108 Cal. App. 2d 207, 238 P.2d 652 (1951); Martin v.
Butter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 562, 209 P.2d 636 (1949); Grant v. The Aerodraulics Co., 91
Cal. App. 2d 68, 204 P.2d 683 (1949); Tucker v. Schmacher, 90 Cal. App. 2d 71, 202
P.2d 327 (1949); San Roque Properties, Inc. v. Pierce, 18 Cal. App. 2d 379, 63 P.2d
1198 (1937); Klein Norton Co. v. Cohen, 107 Cal. App. 325, 290 Pac. 613 (1930);
Haberman v. Sawall, 72 Cal. App. 576, 237 Pac. 776 (1925).
[Vol. 12THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Thus while the pre-existing duty rule applies in California it does
not prevent rescission of a mutually executory bilateral contract and
formation of a new contract which is more advantageous to one party,
or novation with the same consequences.
Western Lithograph Co. v. Vanomar Producers73 applies the pre-
existing duty rule, denying enforcement of an agreement to pay more
for goods than called for by the contract. In contrast is San Gabriel
Valley Ready-Mixt v. Casillas.7- There seller by written contract
agreed to sell a quantity of cement at a certain price. Seller then
asked a higher price which buyer declined to pay, saying he would
get the cement elsewhere. Finding that he would have to pay higher
prices elsewhere, buyer came back to seller. It was held that the orig-
inal contract had been "abandoned" and a new one formed, in short
that there was a novation and that buyer was required to pay seller
his higher price. Also in contrast is Jura v. Sunshine Biscuits.75 Seller
made a written contract to sell a quantity of figs for 200,000 dollars.
Thereafter buyer advised that figs had become a glut on the market
and that it could not afford to stand by the deal. Seller advised in
return that it did not want to lose buyer's good will and that it would
forego profit so as to be able to supply the figs at a lesser price. Buyer
Ihen took the figs and paid 120,000 dollars, its understanding of the
lesser price. Seller sought and was denied recovery of the original
price. It was found that the parties had rescinded the original con-
tract and had formed a new one at a lower price.
C. Integration of Successive Agreements-
Real Estate Transactions
In real estate transactions escrow instructions may conflict with
the contract so as to modify the obligation of one party in some way.
Here it may be held that documents executed as part of a single trans-
action are to be taken together to determine the agreement of the
parties with the later document superseding the earlier to the extent
it is in conflict with it.
76
73 185 Cal. 366, 197 Pac. 103 (1921).
74 142 Cal. App. 2d 137, 298 P.2d 76 (1956).
75 118 Cal. App. 2d 442, 258 P.2d 90 (1953).
76 CAL. CMy. CODE § 1642. Neher v. Kauffman, 197 Cal. 674, 242 Pac. 713 (1925);
Hawes v. Lux, 111 Cal. App. 21, 294 Pac. 1080 (1931). See also RESTATEmENT, CoN-
TaACTS § 408 (1932). Compare King v. Stanley, 32 Cal. 2d 584, 197 P.2d 321 (1948)
with Zlozower v. Lindenbaum, 100 Cal. App. 766, 281 Pac. 102 (1929).
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D. Discharge, Novation, Accord and Satisfaction,
and Written Acceptance of Part Performance
Statutes provide for discharge of contracts by novation77 and by
two kinds of accord and satisfaction-accord and satisfaction as such,
78
and written acceptance of part performance. 79 Only the last is an
exception to the consideration requirement but the other two involve
exceptional treatment of that requirement and the three are so closely
interrelated as to require discussion together.
Two of these have it in common that they do not extinguish the
contract until they are executed: accord does not extinguish the orig-
inal contract until there is satisfaction;80 and a written agreement to
accept part performance of a contract does not discharge it until the
performance is actually rendered.8' Novation on the other hand oper-
ates to extinguish the original contract immediately so that it is a
defense to an action on that contract,8 2 which accord and satisfaction
is not,88 and the original contract is not revived if the substituted
contract is not performed.
84
7 CAL. CrV. CODE § 1530: "Novation is the substitution of a new obligation for an
existing one." CAL. CrV. CODE § 1531: "Novation is made: ... By substitution of a new
obligation between the same parties, with intent to extinguish the old obligation." CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1532: "Novation is made by contract, and is subject to all the rules con-
cerning contracts in general."
78 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1521: "An accord is an agreement to accept, in extinction of an
obligation, something different from or less than that to which the person agreeing to
accept is entitled." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1522: "Though the parties to an accord are bound
to execute it, yet it does not extinguish the obligation until it is fully executed." CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1523: "Acceptance by the creditor, of the consideration of an accord, ex-
tinguishes the obligation, and is called satisfaction."
79 CAL. CrV. CODE § 1524, text quoted note 50 supra.
go CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1521, 1522, 1523, texts quoted note 73 supra. See Gardiner
v. Gaither, 162 Cal. App. 2d 607, 329 P.2d 22 (1958). An executory accord is not a de-
fense. Silvers v. Grossman, 183 Cal. 696, 192 Pac. 534 (1920); Blumer v. Madden, 128
Cal. App. 22, 16 P.2d 319 (1932). Can it be specifically enforced or breach made the
subject of an action for damages, particularly in view of the provisions of Civil Code
§ 1522? No case is found. An argument for an affirmative answer was made in Com-
ment, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 411 (1924). See also Comment, 17 CA.LIF. L. REv. 153, note
21, at 160 (1929). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 417 (1932), permits enforcement.
81 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1524, text quoted at note 50 supra.
82 Alexander v. Angel, 37 Cal. 2d 856, 236 P.2d 561 (1951); Beckwith v. Sheldon,
165 Cal. 319, 131 Pac. 1049 (1913); Richardson v. Hislop, 109 Cal. App. 440, 293 Pac.
168 (1930). But there must be intent to extinguish the old obligation. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1530, text quoted at note 72 supra. And there is particular reluctance to find
this where one debt is undertaken to be substituted for another. See cases collected in
1 WrTKmr, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts § 315 (7th ed. 1960). See also
Bowden v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 36 Cal. 2d 406, 224 P.2d 713 (1950).
83 See cases cited note 75 supra.
s4See cases cited note 77 supra. See also Producers Fruit Co. v. Goddard, 75 Cal.
App. 737, 243 Pac. 686 (1925) (original contract discharged though new contract un-
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Part performance must be accepted in writing.85 Accord and sat-
isfaction can be oral or evidenced by conduct.8 This permits part
payment, without more, to work an accord and satisfaction, and the
"check-cashing rule" in all of its ramifications has been the important
body of case law under the accord and satisfaction statute.87 Accord
and satisfaction is a contract concept, however, so that part payment
of an undisputed obligation will not operate as an accord and satis-
faction.88 Written acceptance of part payment will, on the other hand,
discharge an undisputed obligation.8 9 Novation is also a contract
concept,90 but, as has been seen, the mutual surrender of executory
rights provides consideration for discharge of the original contract. 1
Written Release: Civil Code Section 1541
A written release discharges an obligation though no considera-
tion is given for the release.92 Weddle v. Heath98 indicated that Civil
Code section 15419- requires an express release but two later cases
have departed from such a requirement. In Sappo v. Crestetto95 it
was held that a receipt was sufficient to constitute a release; a dissent
protested this departure from the requirement of an express release.
And in Newman v. Albert9" it was held that a "waiver" of interest
constituted a release.
enforceable-is this the intent of the parties?) Compare Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314,
95 Pac. 154 (1908); Young v. Benton, 21 Cal. App. 382 131 Pac. 1051 (1913). See
Comment, 14 CALiF. L. REv. 408 (1926).
85 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1524, text quoted at note 50 supra.
86 Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).
87 Ibid., and cases cited therein.
88 Berger v. Lane, 190 Cal. 443, 213 Pac. 45 (1923); Lapp-Gifford Co., v. Muscoy
Water Co., 166 Cal. 25, 134 Pac. 989 (1913). "But 'it matters not that there was no
solid foundation for the dispute' as the test is whether 'the dispute was honest or fraud-
ulent."' Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., supra note 81, at 597, 234 P.2d. at 18.
89B. & W. Eng'r. Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal. App. 164, 137 Pac. 624 (1913). See Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, 2 Cal. App. 2d 646, 38 P.2d 482 (1934). See
also Schwartz v. California Claim Service, Ltd., 52 Cal. App. 2d 47, 125 P.2d 883
(1942) (judgment); and CAr.. CODE Civ. Phoc. § 675.
90 CAr.. CIV. CODE § 1532, text quoted at note 72 supra.
01 San Gabriel Valley Ready-Mixt v. Casillas, 142 Cal. 2d 137, 298 P.2d 76 (1956).
92 CA. Civ. CODE § 1541, text quoted at note 50, supra. Weddle v. Heath, 211
Cal. 445, 295 Pac. 832 (1931); Newman v. Albert, 170 Cal. App. 2d 678, 339 P.2d
588 (1959); Crow v. P.E.G. Constr. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 271, 319 P.2d 47 (1957);
Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 770, 236 P.2d 201 (1951). Compare
Mesmer v. White, 121 Cal. App. 2d 665, 264 P.2d 60 (1953). (CAL. Civ. CODE § 1541
requires creditor-debtor relation).
03 Supra note 87.
04 Text quoted note 50 supra.
O,78 Cal. App. 2d 362, 177 P.2d 950 (1947).
9 Supra note 87.
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E. Discharge by Abandonment, Etc.
The case law establishes that parties may terminate a mutually
executory contract by processes variously described as abandonment,
abrogation, termination, cancellation, and rescission, all of which in
this context have the same meaning.97 The mutual release of exec-
utory rights is made consideration for discharge of the contract.98
III. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the California courts will not apply the doctrine of
consideration in doctrinaire fashion and will afford parties substantial
leeway to settle practical problems in a practical way. It remains for
the legislature to make the changes of a drastic nature which are left
to be made, such as "firm offer" statutes.
97 See cases cited note 67 supra.
98 Jura v. Sunshine Biscuits, 118 Cal. App. 2d 442, 258 P.2d 90 (1953); Martin
v. Butter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 562, 209 P.2d 636 (1949).
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